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SYMPOSIUM ON BANKING REFORM
TOWARD DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM
HENRY B. GONZALEZ*
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The subjects of this article are deposit insurance reform and the safety
of the deposit insurance funds. There may be no more important issues
facing Congress. For this reason, I introduced comprehensive deposit
insurance reform legislation' on January 3, 1991, the first day of the 102d
Congress. My proposal would limit insurance coverage; improve capital,
accounting, and examination requirements; restrict risky activities of in-
sured depository institutions; establish a consolidated supervisory and
regulatory structure within a single agency; and protect consumers and
customers of bank services.
For many years I have been concerned about our deposit insurance
system--one of the cornerstones of this nation's financial and economic
stability. It was evident to me that the deposit insurance system was
vulnerable to abuse, economic adversity, and regulatory failure.
The failure of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) began the greatest financial scandal in the history of the nation.
No one knows what the cost will be; only history will determine that
* Chairman, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, United States House of
Representatives.
1. Deposit Insurance and Regulatory Reform Act of 1991, H.R. 6, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137
CONG. REC. H53 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1991).
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figure. We do know that we must solve the problems left by a decade of
financial excesses, legislative errors, and unprecedented regulatory
failure.
Four or five years ago no one wanted to admit what we must now
confront: the entire deposit insurance system urgently needs repair. In
addition to the failure of the savings and loan insurance fund, the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF) today faces a fifth consecutive year of multi-billion
dollar losses; its reserve level, still decreasing, is less than a quarter of the
amount designated by law for minimum safety. The Administration has
proposed refinancing the Bank Insurance Fund through a complicated
mechanism of borrowing and premium increases.
THE BANK INSURANCE FUND IS A PRIORITY
The problem is undoubtedly upon us. A recent study2 estimates that
at least $50 to $70 billion in assets in portfolios of insured commercial
banks and mutual savings banks have lost their economic viability. An-
other $300 plus billion of assets likely will need restructuring by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) by the end of 1992,
depending upon the length and duration of the current recession.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has testified' that the FDIC is
underestimating the number of institutions that are likely to fail. GAO
expects BIF's reserves, at the end of 1991, to range between $1 billion
and negative $5 billion. In fact, the GAO recommended that immediate
action be taken to rebuild the BIF in order to prevent its insolvency.
Congress must recognize the critical need to deal with the recapitaliza-
tion of the Bank Insurance Fund as soon as possible so that regulators
have the necessary money and authority to deal with failing banks in a
timely fashion at the least cost to the fund.
We must ensure that regulators have the proper tools for prompt inter-
vention before a bank fails, when problems with management, asset qual-
ity, or capital are first detected. We must require annual audits and
examinations and improved internal management. Any financing
machanism must be open and direct, and repaid through premium in-
come from the industry. And it must be timely-we cannot wait for the
2. L. BRYAN, RESTORING THE HEALTH AND PROFITABILITY OF THE U.S. BANKING SYSTEM
(1990).
3. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (April 26, 1991) (Statement of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United
States).
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resolution of all the other controversial items constantly on the Banking
Committee's agenda.4
The necessary elements of BIF refinancing and reform include:
** Realistic accounting practices by institutions and regulators;
** Hard-nosed supervision and on-site annual examinations;
** Prompt regulatory intervention in troubled institutions;
** Least-cost resolution of insolvent institutions;
** Refinancing the insurance fund in the most straightforward and least
expensive manner;
** Limiting coverage of deposit amounts over $100,000; and
** Ending the "Too big to fail" regulatory policy.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Some of the elements of BIF refinancing are also important deposit
insurance reforms. Deposit insurance is at the heart of our financial and
economic stability; we ignore its problems and possible solutions only
with the greatest peril. The failure of the FSLIC and the hundreds of
billions of dollars it will cost American taxpayers are warnings we cannot
ignore. Reform is imperative.
Of course, we must and will meet our commitment to current deposi-
tors in insured depository institutions. But we must do more than pro-
tect insured depositors; we must also reform the deposit insurance system
so that American taxpayers will not provide a continual and constant
deep pocket for a system that increasingly seems to send profits to bank-
ers and losses to the American taxpayer.
Deposit insurance reform really began with the passage of the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA).5  The increased capital requirements, limitations on the
permissible investments that federally insured but state chartered savings
associations could make, and the enhanced enforcement powers given to
the regulatory agencies are some of the most important features of de-
4. For this reason, I introduced, for myself and Mr. Annunzio, Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, H.R. 2094, 102d Cong. 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REG. H2563
(daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991). This Bill provides additional resources to the Bank Insurance Fund, to
require the least cost resolution of insured depository institutions, and to improve supervision and
examination of such institutions.
5. On August 9, 1989, the President signed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 188 (codfied in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S. Code).
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posit insurance reform in FIRREA. Many other issues have yet to be
addressed.
This Article outlines my own proposals for deposit insurance reform.
Reform is necessary because, over the past few years, deposit insurance
coverage has been extended, primarily through regulatory actions or de-
cisions, to almost every deposit for almost any amount. Multimillion
dollar accounts are protected as if the insurance coverage "passes
through" to recipients. Amounts over $100,000 are regularly protected
when insolvent institutions are resolved, in spite of the clear language of
the law passed in 1980 that limits coverage to $100,000. In fact, studies
by the Banking Committee have shown that more than 99% of all depos-
its in failed banks, including those over $100,000, have been covered by
the FDIC. The sole exception provided for by statute, when a particular
institution's deposit services are "essential to its community," has been
turned on its head.'
THE BENEFITS OF REFORM
Reforming the deposit insurance system will benefit the American tax-
payer. Limiting the scope of deposit insurance coverage reduces the ex-
posure of the insurance funds to losses caused by insolvent institutions,
but retains coverage for the vast majority of depositors for whom the
system was originally designed.
Groups, sometimes well-meaning, will press for special or extended
coverage. We must decide if and when such special treatment is in the
best interests of our financial system and its institutions. We need to
balance the benefits and costs of deposit insurance. One thing is clear:
the current system may be the most costly financial problem this nation
ever has faced.
Deposit insurance creates what has been described as a "moral haz-
ard," that is, an inducement to take risks because losses are insured by
the federal government. Deposit insurance also removes the need to ask
why an insured institution is offering above average interest rates or
whether the institution's loan policies are prudent or risky. Ordinary
depositors should not be burdened with making these judgments, but
6. In response to a letter I sent to Chairman Seidman of the FDIC on January 14, 1991,
Chairman Seidman replied: "Essentiality has been found in instances in which a bank is providing
necessary banking services to a community that are not otherwise available or ... when severe
financial conditions exist threatening the stability of a significant number of insured banks or banks
possessing significant financial resources. " (emphasis supplied).
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professional money managers and sophisticated brokerage houses ought
to be responsible for their investment decisions.
In addition, many institutions have not been allowed to fail even when
insolvent, institutions that seem "too big to fail." Further, if an institu-
tion does fail, most uninsured liabilities are transferred and protected as
if they were insured. Knowledge of these circumstances allows deposi-
tors and investors alike generally to conduct business without regard for
insurance limitations or the condition of the institution.
THE PRINCIPLES OF REFORM
Reform must be guided by clear principles. If we keep these principles
in mind, we can overcome the complex problems that lie along the road
to reform. The underlying goal of my proposal is to strengthen and pro-
tect the deposit insurance funds. We can reach that goal by adhering to
four basic principles:
First: Ensure and stringently enforce adequate capital standards.
Second: Limit insurance coverage to the amount authorized by law.
Third: Require regulators to take strong, certain, and prompt
action when an institution begins to lose capital.
Fourth: Make holding companies and affiliates of insured depository
institutions responsible for losses incurred by their insured
depository institutions.
Though these ideas are simple, they involve many complex details. I
submit that if these principles are followed faithfully, the goal of a strong
deposit insurance system ultimately can be reached.
Consider the lessons from the failure of the savings and loan insurance
system. We learned that it is fatal to permit insured institutions to
operate with little or no capital, because the money they risk is not their
own, but that of depositors and, ultimately, the taxpayers who insure the
safety of those deposits. We learned that temporizing or forebearance
only allows embedded weaknesses to fester and grow. We learned that
permitting too much regulatory discretion only leads to the
postponement of the day of reckoning, tempting regulators to delay
action when institutions are hopelessly insolvent.
We learned that a deposit insurance fund must be strong enough to
handle problems far greater than anyone previously had imagined.
Finally, we learned, most of all, that certain fundamental principles must
be known clearly, well understood, and faithfully adhered to, if insured
institutions are to remain safe and sound.
1991]
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Our system of deposit insurance is unique. Both state and federally
chartered institutions are insured, even though states may permit banks
to exercise powers that federally chartered banks cannot.7 Because it is
backed by the American taxpayer, the distortions and weaknesses of the
system can be ignored no longer. Reform is inescapable. The task will
neither be simple nor pleasant, but it is essential if this unique system is
to be preserved.
Last year, we removed ceilings on deposit insurance premium
assessments and gave the FDIC the authority to set premiums as needed
and appropriate. The existence of the premium ceiling created false
expectations that deposit insurance would be cheap, regardless of the
underlying risks. In fact, recent studies have shown that deposit
insurance is significantly underpriced, even at today's higher premium
levels.
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
We need to do more. First, we need to limit the scope of coverage by
limiting the number of accounts any one person can have and by elimi-
nating pass-through coverage for super accounts that money managers
and pension funds bundle in amounts over $100,000. We need to set up a
system of risk-based assessments so that institutions with riskier portfo-
lios and investments pay more for their insurance coverage. While I rec-
ognize that not every risk can be quantified and that risks can change
over time, I also believe that risks can and should be taken into account
in the premium assessment system; insured depository institutions that
take greater risks should pay insurance premiums commensurate with
that risk.
We need to extend assessments to foreign deposits if they are going to
be treated as insured in any event. This would increase revenues to the
insurance funds, and also would be fundamentally fair, since protected
deposits should be assessed a premium.
Another critical reform needed is a limit on the permissible risk of
investments of insured funds. In 1989, in FIRREA, we limited invest-
ments that savings and loan associations can make: no junk bonds, limits
on loans to one borrower, and other restrictions. Additionally, we estab-
lished risk-based capital standards. In each instance, the idea was to pro-
7. FIRREA, however, restricted state chartered savings associations to activities permissible
for those that were federally chartered.
[Vol. 69:665
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vide both limits on risks and incentives to reduce the risks taken with
insured funds. Some of these restrictions already applied to banks; we
need to see what, if any, additional restrictions should be imposed on
banks.
The steps I have outlined are not merely prudent, they are essential to
build a deposit insurance fund that has strength approaching a reason-
able level.
Not only do we have to strengthen the funds, we have to protect them.
No insurance system can survive unlimited risks or wanton recklessness.
Therefore, reform must protect those funds, not merely to prevent
payouts, but to ensure the basic safety of the financial system itself. The
weakness of the fund clearly reveals the underlying weakness of the na-
tion's banking system.
PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTION
These measures, many of them enacted for savings associations in
FIRREA, should now be extended to banks in order to protect the bank-
ing system and the insurance fund standing behind deposits.
The first and most important step is to strengthen capital. Capital is
the money that the owners of financial institutions have at risk. If own-
ers have little or no capital at risk, the only money they are really risking
is the money of the insurance system and of the taxpayers who back it
up. Conversely, if the owners of an institution have a great deal of capi-
tal at risk, they are much more likely to be both more profitable and
more prudent. Capital is the key, the indispensable element.
In FIRREA, we went a long way toward taking the necessary action:
we prevented savings associations from operating without capital; we
eliminated the idea that phony capital is a substitute for the real thing;
and we firmly established the principle that capital should reflect the risk
of the underlying assets-the greater the risk, the higher the capital.
Accounting standards that overstate asset value or understate liabili-
ties ought to be eliminated. Whenever possible, assets ought to be com-
puted on a market value basis; book values, which sometimes fail to
reflect what an asset can be sold for, distort economic reality. Where
assets are of a type that are not often traded and thus cannot readily be
marked to market, independent valuations should be made on a regular
basis.
Never again should there be any notion of substituting phony capital
1991]
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for the real thing, or of allowing institutions to continue in operation
without a safe level of capital.
Insured depository institutions need tough, independent audits. These
audits should include a comprehensive review of the institution's opera-
tions and financial statements and all other reports filed with the regula-
tors. In addition, an audit must report on the institution's financial
position and determine the accuracy of the institution's call reports. Au-
ditors also must verify management's assertions regarding internal con-
trols and compliance with applicable laws and regulations.
An independent regulator regularly must evaluate capital require-
ments. In a dynamic and rapidly changing world, no one capital stan-
dard is right for all institutions at all times. Certain absolute minimums
are necessary, but regulators routinely must determine appropriate levels
for additional minimum capital and must assess the need to change risk
weighting.
REGULATORY RESTRUCTURING
Insured depository institutions currently are supervised by one or
more primary federal regulatory agency: the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency for national banks, the Office of Thrift Supervision for sav-
ings associations the Federal Reserve for state member banks, the FDIC
for state nonmember banks, and the states for state-chartered banks and
savings associations. The result has been a crazy-quilt pattern of over-
lapping interpretive and enforcement standards. A single, independent
regulatory agency would provide the consistent and efficient administra-
tion of laws and regulations necessary to protect the safety of insured
institutions.' A single supervisory agency would eliminate the remnants
of the age-old tradition of agency-constituency relationships that have
sometimes led agencies to become cheerleaders for their segment of the
industry, rather than objective, flinty supervisors. For example, many
justifiably perceived the former Federal Home Loan Bank Board, parent
of the FSLIC, as a captive of the savings and loan industry it was sup-
posed to regulate and insure.
Regulatory and examination staffs must be large enough and suffi-
8. My plan would retain the FDIC as the federal insurance regulator. The new agency would
have primary responsibility for financially healthy institutions; the FDIC would retain authority for
administering the insurance funds and resolving insolvent institutions. When an institution's capital
falls below minimum capital standards, the FDIC would have the authority to impose certain re-
strictions on the institution's activities to protect the insurance fund.
[Vol. 69:665
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ciently trained to enable more frequent examinations of institutions.
Never again should there be institutions that are not regularly examined.
We must require annual on-site examinations of all large banks and
known problem banks. Although on-site exams are labor-intensive and
time-consuming, their value far outweighs these concerns. It should be
obvious to all that better and more timely information saves us money in
the long run.
We must enforce the statutory insurance limit per account. As mat-
ters stand today, more than 99 percent of all deposits are effectively in-
sured, notwithstanding the $100,000 limit authorized by law. The
regulators effectively evade limits by allowing coverage of giant accounts
to be treated as if they were "passed through" to clients of pension sys-
tems; further evasion occurs because a single individual can have multi-
ple insured accounts in a single institution and in unlimited additional
institutions.
In addition, the resolution methods commonly used by the FDIC sim-
ply pass all accounts, regardless of size, from a failed institution to an
acquirer. The FDIC has covered 99.5 percent of all deposits from failed
banks since 1985! To prevent such overcoverage, we need to enforce the
cost test to determine which resolutions are indeed the least costly for the
insurance funds. We need to require the least-cost solution in the short-
est time possible.
The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), established by FIRREA to
resolve failed savings associations, also generally has been transferring
uninsured liabilities that would not be covered during an insurance ac-
tion. In its legal capacity as exclusive manager of the RTC, the FDIC
has provided insurance coverage to 99.97 percent of the $62 billion in
deposits in failed thrifts restructured by the RTC. Consequently, we
need to examine proposals that would require a mandatory "haircut."
Such proposals mandate a reduction in coverage for amounts over
$100,000 in cases in which the regulator determines that it is cheaper to
provide assistance and transfer the uninsured liabilities rather than to
liquidate and pay off only amounts of $100,000 or less.
LIMITING INSURANCE COVERAGE
Forcing the regulators to adhere to the $100,000 limit affects only a
small number of depositors. According to the Office of Thrift Supervi-
sion, as of September 1989, 87.6 percent of all deposits in savings associa-
tions were under $100,000. In fact, the average size of an account in a
1991]
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savings institution was $8,733.20. The FDIC estimates that the average
size of bank accounts may be slightly higher. The overwhelming major-
ity of depositors would be protected fully with far less insurance coverage
than the law currently provides, and a prohibition on covering amounts
over $100,000 would affect only about two percent of all depositorsl
The purpose of deposit insurance is not to protect all depositors-it is
to protect small depositors who do not have the means to investigate the
safety of a given investment. A reduction in the amount of coverage
would encourage greater prudence by large investors and bank manage-
ment alike. As it is, everyone feels free to take a flyer in a weak bank,
knowing that Uncle Sam will pick up the pieces if the bank fails. This
"hot money" phenomenon would be diminished with a lower amount of
coverage, without adversely affecting the overwhelming majority of
depositors.
I also propose preventing multiple insured accounts. It might be rea-
sonable to allow each customer insurance on a personal account and a
separate custodial account like an IRA. But today, not only can deposi-
tors have hundreds of thousands of dollars insured in differently styled
accounts, all in a single institution, they can repeat the process in every
single bank or savings and loan; this is a distortion and abuse of the
insurance system.
So-called "super" accounts, like bank investment contracts (BICs),
jumbo pension fund deposits, and other super accounts managed by so-
phisticated money managers, should not get the kind of free multimillion
dollar protection that exists today. The professional fiduciaries or trust-
ees who place these funds ought to be able to evaluate risks for their
beneficiaries and certainly should not be rewarded for placing huge sums
in weak institutions. Congress should study these super accounts:
whether some kinds of pension plans should be able to get "pass
through" insurance coverage as they do now; what kind of protection do
pension plan participants need that they don't have now; and should this
protection now be provided by federally insured depository institutions,
rather than established entities such as the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation?
REQUIRE PROMPT REGULATORY INTERVENTION
An additional and vital principle of my reform proposal, embodied in
provisions of both H.R. 6 and H.R. 2094, is to limit the discretion of
[Vol. 69:665
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regulators when an institution is in a weakened position. This is the most
important way to resolve the "nobody can fail" problem.
At the heart of the FSLIC disaster was the failure of the regulators to
take prompt and forceful action to close insolvent institutions. The use
of "regulatory accounting" gimmicks, the hopes that time or "forbear-
ance" from legal or regulatory standards would allow problems to re-
solve themselves, and the idea that real capital was not really necessary,
all contributed to the growing depth and breadth of the current losses.
Hearing exactly those same kinds of proposals now, from the banking
regulatory agencies for banks, deeply disturbs me. If we have learned
one thing, it is that forbearance, postponing the day of financial reckon-
ing, only costs American taxpayers more money in the long run.
I propose that regulators follow clearly prescribed actions when an
insured institution's capital is impaired: the greater the impairment, the
more stringent the action and the less discretion permitted. All institu-
tions, regardless of size, would be treated in a like way whenever their
capital is impaired and with certainty as weakness develops.
Regulators need to set clear standards and limits on asset growth, par-
ticularly by weaker institutions, and put the same mandatory, stringent
regulatory responses into place. Finally, when management and manage-
ment controls are clearly deficient, regulators need to force change in
both, before the assets of the institution are dissipated and losses to the
insurance funds result.
FIRREA imposed mandatory restrictions on capital impaired savings
and loans. Similar mandatory actions clearly ought to be a central ele-
ment in protecting the bank insurance fund. But such treatment still is
neither certain nor uniform. I propose to remedy that. The 101st Con-
gress passed legislation 9 prohibiting an institution with capital below a
minimum level from paying "golden parachutes" to failing managers.
We now need to restrict an institution's ability to pay dividends when it
ought to be replenishing capital.
When an institution is weak or failing, there should be no payments to
affiliates without regulatory approval. Limits on growth, payments on
subordinated debt interest and the like all should be restricted in a sys-
tematic and non-discretionary way as conditions worsen, at least when
capital continues to decline. Similarly, regulatory controls on highly
capitalized institutions should be loosened.
9. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2523, 104 Stat. 4789, 4868.
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In addition, and of great importance, I would require a clear capital
restoration plan when a bank goes below current minimum standards
(just as we did for savings associations in FIRREA); I would require a
mandatory conservatorship or receivership at a lower level, perhaps at a
two percent capital level; and, in no event would I permit regulators to
keep open an insolvent institution. The clarity and certainty of the ac-
tions I have proposed in recently introduced legislation10 would impose a
salutary discipline on the regulators and regulated alike. Similar steps
have been proposed by the Treasury Department.
STRENGTHEN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
But there are still more actions needed to protect a strengthened de-
posit insurance system.
In FIRREA, we made commonly controlled insured depository insti-
tutions liable for each other's losses. Thus, when a number of insured
institutions are commonly controlled, the controlling entity cannot allow
one or more institutions to sink, hold on to only the healthy ones, and
thereby leave the government holding the bag. This principle must be
extended to all insured depository institution holding companies.
In addition, we should consider proposals that would assess certain
peer institutions. We could divide institutions into categories based on
size, and assess institutions with assets over a certain amount, for exam-
ple $5 billion, for failures among their peers. This would end the present
problem of smaller institutions effectively subsidizing their bigger rivals.
It would also induce their larger peers to do more self policing. Regula-
tors also might be given the authority to distribute assets from a failed
institution to other institutions in the class.
I do not believe that the so-called firewall concept is very effective in
preventing a holding company from undertaking activities that can put
insured depository institutions at risk. In fact, "when the heat is on, the
firewalls burn down." I propose that instead of depending on firewalls or
"activity restraints," we extend FIRREA's principle of cross guarantees
and require indemnification or liability provisions running from the par-
ent or affiliate to the insured institution. In this way, there is a strong
and, I hope, compelling financial incentive to avoid actions by the parent
company that can wreck the insured institution.
Similarly, the cross-guarantee concept needs clarification, so that the
10. See supra notes 1, 4.
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regulators' authority to require a holding company to recapitalize in-
sured affiliates is unquestioned. We should provide for cross-guarantees
and clarify the authority of regulators to require a holding company to
re-capitalize an insured depository institution subsidiary. All subsidiar-
ies of the holding company ought to be separately capitalized.
The operative principle here is to provide incentives for holding com-
panies or affiliates not to loot the bank or let it go down the drain, secure
in the knowledge that the insurance fund (and ultimately the American
taxpayer) will pick up the pieces. After all, those who own banks are
given special privilege and status through their charters; they owe a spe-
cial responsibility in exchange for that privilege and status.
We cannot continue to let the deposit insurance system underwrite the
greatest risks, while all the profits go to owners and managers. Strength-
ening the system of cross guarantees, better than constructing elaborate
but always vulnerable firewalls, is the best possible protection against
moral hazard. An entity that has its own money at the greatest risk is
not likely to undertake foolish or risky ventures. What regulation and
proscription cannot accomplish, economic incentives can-this is the
way to minimize the moral hazard that is associated with the deposit
insurance structure today.
NEW POWERS FOR BANKS
Some have suggested that now is the time to grant banks new powers
and increased possibilities of geographic expansion. I disagree. I do not
believe that insured depository institutions should be able to engage in
underwriting securities or insurance. I disagree with those who think
that the restrictions concerning the mingling of commerce and banking
should be lifted. It would be a mistake to propose new and risky activi-
ties for banks before supervisory and insurance reforms are in place and
working. This same "cart before the horse" mentality plagued the dereg-
ulation of the savings and loan industry in the early 1980s.
Insured depository funds should not be placed at high risk. We must
set limits and train the regulators before we expose insured depository
institutions to the additional credit and interest rate risks involved with
new powers and new affiliate relationships.
SUMMARY
My goals, to strengthen and protect the deposit insurance system, and
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thus the insured depository institutions it stands behind, can be done by
providing and enforcing adequate capital standards, by limiting insur-
ance coverage and requiring realistic pricing for that coverage, by unify-
ing the regulatory system and making it independent, by requiring
regulators to act promptly and decisively when an insured institution be-
gins to weaken, and by making holding companies or affiliates responsi-
ble for losses their insured institutions incur.
The reforms I am offering will not be easy, but they are necessary.
Various groups will ask the Congress to continue special treatment or
extended coverage. We must make the hard decisions and take the high
road, the road that protects not only the financial system but the tax-
payer. We need to consider rolling back the regulatory exceptions and
extensions that have gradually expanded coverage over time. Delay will
not make the task any easier, only harder and more costly. Despite all
distractions, despite all pleas to avoid these necessary actions, the re-
forms I have outlined must be adopted. The only question is whether we
will act before the next storm clouds break.
[Vol. 69:665
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